The Rise And Fall Of The AFL In Kansas City

First, I want to state that the demise of the Kansas City Brigade/Command is not all Chris Likens fault. The economic collapse of 2008 has affected every sport in the land. Even the almighty NFL and NASCAR have had to adjust their economic models in these tough times. The AFL is no different. After several years of supposed growth, with franchises selling for as much as a reported twenty million dollars and top end players making two hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year, the league shut down for a year for restructuring. When they returned, a large number of fans did not. AFL strongholds such as Tampa Bay, Orlando, Arizona and San Jose did not come close to their pre–restructuring attendance numbers. Also, you had franchises folding or moving to find a viable market. The league is at a crossroads and needs a visionary leader and I do not believe Jerry Kurz is that man, but that is a story for another day.
As far as Kansas City is concerned, we need to go back to 2005. That is when a group announced they were pursuing an AFL franchise for the Kansas City area. Upon hearing about this I immediately contacted the group about helping them with their pursuit. Over the next nine months I was in constant contact with this group helping with possible corporate season ticket accounts. I eventually parted ways with the group just before the inaugural kickoff but still maintained in contact with some front office people.
The original ownership group did not have enough financial backing to maintain the franchise and that is when Chris Likens stepped up to help them out. I give Mr. Likens credit for making the move to help out the local sports landscape. He did not have to do this. He was a successful business man who did not have to sink his money into a money pit that most sports teams turn out to be. He saw it as a civic duty.
Soon after Likens came aboard as an owner the original ownership group left one by one. The thought of most people I talked to that were still with the team is that they were forced out by Likens. After he was the sole owner Likens made what I thought was a smart move. He brought in a person with AFL front office experience (I believe he had worked for either Iowa or Chicago) as Director of Football Operations. This relationship did not last for more than one season because the individual was looking for a General Manager position and Likens did not want to have one for the Brigade. This is when I believe things took a turn for the worse for this franchise. Likens started bringing in family to run the franchise. His son was named president and his brother (if I remember right) became Director of Operations. He also hired other family members for positions with the team. None of these individuals had any experience in sports. Likens owns a successful mortgage business and I believe that he thought he could just move people over from that business to the Brigade and they would not miss a beat. Now professional sports are still a business and the goal is to turn a profit but it is a totally different animal than the mortgage business. The New York Yankees are an extremely successful franchise but would you hire Brian Cashman (the GM) as the next CEO of Bank Of America and expect him to know everything about banking. This was a case of “The Blind Leading The Blind“.
On the field the Brigade had only mild success. The team finished their 2006 inaugural season with a record of 3–13, placing them fifth in the National Conference Southern Division.
In their second season the Brigade achieved a 10–6 record, earning the American Conference's #3 seed. They hosted their first playoff game, a wild-card matchup, with the American Conference's #6 seed, the Colorado Crush. Unfortunately for the Brigade, the Crush won 49–42, despite Colorado coming into the game with a 4-game losing streak.
The 2008 season saw the team move into their new home, the Sprint Center. Again Likens made a bad move. After making the playoffs the year before he cut payroll putting out an inferior product. Again this is only my opinion but I believe he thought that people would show up to games to see the new arena and it did not matter if the team was competitive. This strategy did not work. As losing mounted the attendance dropped. The low point of the season came in week four when the Brigade lost to the Grand Rapids Rampage 92–52. The team again finished 3-13 and fourth in the American Conference Central Division.
There would be no 2009 season as the league shut down to restructure their business plan. The one that was in place and implemented by outgoing commissioner David Baker was failing. It featured over–inflated franchise values and player salaries that could not be maintained.
The AFL returned in 2010 but the Brigade did not. Most Kansas City fans thought that the AFL was dead in this town but they still held out hope that it could come back. They were rewarded in 2011 with Likens bringing back the franchise. There was a name the team contest and the name ‘Command’ won. Most people I talked to felt it was not a true contest. They thought (myself included), that the team just wanted a name that more closely tied in with the existing logo. That they had no intention of completely changing the name and logo.
The management mistakes picked up where they left off. Hiring people that had little or no experience with the AFL. The one bright spot was the hiring of Nick McCabe as Director of Communications. McCabe has extensive experience in Kansas City sports radio.
When it came to marketing the team during their return, most people asked the same question. “Where is it?” The only time you saw or heard a commercial for the team was during a game broadcast. I think that demographic is already aware of your team.
The Command formed a partnership with the Missouri Comets of the Major Indoor Soccer League. I felt this was a smart move. Both teams would have a chance to cross promote each other and there was the possibility of season ticket bundling. The Comets had done a great job of marketing themselves and embracing technology (besides the standard Twitter and Facebook accounts and email updates they also developed smartphone apps). For some reason the Command did not take advantage of this and continued with business as usual.
On the field, the Command continued their sorry performance. In 2011 the team finished 6-12 and 3-15 in 2012. The average attendance for the two seasons was around 4,300. This was after averaging 13,200 in the three previous seasons.
I felt this was the ‘Make Or Break’ year for the team but diehard fans said Likens told them he was in it for the long haul. That he had stated that it took the MLS fifteen years to catch on in Kansas City. Well, I guess the long haul was only two years, because the Command is as dead as disco.
I had held off on writing this article until the team made an official announcement but here it is a month since their season ended and almost two weeks since the ArenaBowl and no announcement. This team did not die with a bang. Hell! It didn’t even die with a wimper. It died with silence and very few mourners (I think more people are disappointed to see arena football end in KC then they are to see the end of the Command).
Now the original owners are back with a team in the new Champions Professional Indoor Football League. It will be a regional league and considered very minor league compared to the AFL. They will play games at Kemper Arena (the Brigade’s original home) and hope to rekindle the excitement that the Brigade had in it’s heyday. Well guys, good luck and I have a piece of advice for you. “Don’t hire your son, brother, uncle or niece. Hire people that have front office experience in indoor football or minor league sports.”